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1Introduction
The need for infrastructure finance in Africa is tremendous. A 2009 report by the World Bank1 
suggests that the continent faces needs of US$93 billion per year. More recent studies, pointing to 
economic and population growth trends and using more sophisticated methods of assessing needs, 
indicate that infrastructure needs are actually much higher.2 As one oft-cited example notes, the 
entire country of Liberia can produce only a third of the electricity consumed by Cowboys Stadium 
in Texas on game day.3 To keep pace with the rapid growth and rising aspirations of Africans, a 
huge infrastructure push is essential. However, it will be equally necessary to focus on sustainable 
infrastructure, to establish a long-term foundation for environmentally and socially sustainable 
growth and prosperity. 
Existing financing sources have not been able to keep pace. The World Bank report indicates 
that overall financing as of 2009 was less than half of estimated needs, with a gap of US$48 billion 
per year. The situation has somewhat improved since then, but the shortfall remains massive. 
Public sector budgets are constrained by limited tax collection, multiple pressing needs and 
capacity constraints. External private financing has been growing, but is overwhelmingly directed 
toward a small number of countries (especially Nigeria and South Africa) and weighted heavily 
toward telecommunications (64% of total in 2005-2013).4 Multilateral and bilateral financing is 
constrained for most sources, although financing from non-traditional bilaterals such as China and 
India has been rising. With such low investment, sustainability concerns have not been high. For 
example, only 0.9% of the world’s renewable energy investment has taken place in the continent, 
and nearly half of that has been in a single country (South Africa).5 
In this context, the role of national development banks (NDBs) in the continent merits 
attention. As will be shown below, many African countries have NDBs, although the vast majority 
are quite small, with limited access to finance and short on capacity. A few, however, are more 
significant players, particularly in infrastructure (notably in Algeria and South Africa), and others 
are undergoing reforms under governments that see their potential as an additional source of finance 
and expertise to promote their country’s development (such as Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda). 
The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of the activities of NDBs in Africa, and present 
two case studies of South African NDBs—Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and the 
Industrial Development Corporation (IDC)—that may provide lessons for other NDBs in Africa 
and beyond. Where data permit, the paper considers general characteristics of the NDBs as well as 
1  Foster and Briceno, 2009.
2  Gutman et. al. 2015.
3  Lefebvre, 2013. 
4  Gutman et. al. 2015.
5  Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, 2015.
2specific information regarding investment in sustainable infrastructure. 
Overview of National Development Banks in Africa
To assess the panorama for NDBs in the African continent, this study undertook a desk review 
of publicly available information. The majority of information came from the websites of NDBs 
themselves, including downloaded publications (notably annual reports and financial statements), 
as well as some press reports. Further information was accessed via the Association of African 
Development Finance Institutions (AADFI) as well as Luna Martinez and Leonardo Vicente 
(2012).
Twenty-nine NDBs were reviewed in Africa that fit the following criteria (see Annex 1 for list):- A substantial ownership stake and control by the host government- Developmental priorities central to mandate- Not mainly/entirely export promotion- Not mainly/entirely commercial banking with for-profit orientation
Of these 29, only 20 have a modicum of financial information available, most from 2013 and 
2014, but in some cases the most recent information dated from 2009. Two NDBs listed below are 
still in the process of creation and have not yet begun operations: Nigerian Development Bank and 
Agricultural Development Bank of Tanzania.
Nineteen of the 29 banks were created prior to the structural adjustment era of the mid-1980s, 
and the majority of these during the period after decolonization in the 1960s and 1970s. Some, 
however, have a longer history. For example the Ethiopian Development Bank dates to 1909, South 
Africa’s IDC was created in 1940 and Kenya’s Industrial and Commercial Bank Corporation was 
set up by the British colonial government in 1954. Most of these older NDBs have gone through 
major restructurings at one or more points in their history. Following the easing of neo-liberal 
economic policies and an ideological shift towards looking more favorably on state involvement in 
the economy since the 2000s, a number of new NDBs have been created in recent years, including 
in Namibia, Sudan, Angola, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. 
In terms of ownership, 25 of the 29 NDBs are majority-owned by their respective governments, 
of which 17 are 100% owned by governments. The only NDBs not majority-owned by governments 
are two in Nigeria (the Infrastructure Bank Plc and the in-creation Nigerian Development Bank) 
and the Liberian Bank for Development and Investment.6 
For those NDBs with a share of non-governmental ownership, shareholders comprised for 
the most part international development agencies such as Agence Française de Développement, 
6  The Development Bank of Mauritius was at last report expected to be privatized, but current information was 
unavailable. 
3European Investment Bank, African Development Bank, KfW, and the World Bank. Domestic 
shareholders mainly include financial institutions such as private banks and pension funds. 
Financial Scale
The financial size of African NDBs varies tremendously. At the upper end of the scale are 
the two main development banks of South Africa – DBSA and IDC – with assets of US$5.8 and 
US$10 billion respectively in 2014/15, along with the Algerian Fonds National d’Investissement 
(US$9.5 billion in assets in 2011), the Nigerian Bank of Industry (US$3.4 billion in 2014) and 
Angola’s Banco de Poupança e Crédito (US$2.3 billion in 2014) (Table 1).7 The smallest NDB 
for which information is available is the Development Bank of Seychelles, with US$43 million in 
assets. Average mean asset size is US$1.8 billion, and the combined total assets for all reporting 
NDBs amounted to US$35.6 billion. 
Table 1. Assets and Development Portfolio, Selected Africa NDBs (US$ millions)
Assets Loans
Equity 
Invest
IDC (South Africa) 10000 1800 6700
Algeria Fonds National d’Investissement 9450 6870 7.7
Development Bank of Southern Africa 5800 4900 41
Angola Banco de Poupança e Crédito 2300 948 0
Bank of Industry (Nigeria) 3400 3000 44
Development Bank of Ethiopia 1500 863 0
Industrial Development and Worker’s Bank of Egypt 597.6 415 0
la Banque Gabonaise de Développement 356.6 173.5 0.024
Botswana Development Corporation 326 172
Industrial Development Bank of Sudan 272 215.2 40.5
TIB Development Bank (Tanzania) 246 184 4
Industrial and Commercial Bank Corporation 
(Kenya) 235.4 12 188
Development Bank of Namibia 253 200 14
Liberian Bank for Development and Investments 210 66 0.28
Development Bank of Rwanda 184.8 131.2 14
Swaziland Development and Savings Bank 156 113 0
Infrastructure Development Bank of Zimbabwe 122.8 51.2 1.6
Banco Nacional de Investimento (Mozambique) 75.9 13.5
Uganda Development Bank Ltd. 68 43.6 0.1
Development Bank of Seychelles 42.3 30.9 0
Source: Latest annual reports or financial statements of all NDBs (2011-2015).
7  These are the most recent years for which data are available. See Annex 1 for details. 
4Of 19 banks with data, loan portfolios range from a high of US$6.9 billion for Algeria to 
US$12 million for Kenya’s Industrial and Commercial Bank Corporation. Average loan portfolio 
is about US$1 billion, and total for all reporting banks is US$20 billion. This compares to total 
outstanding portfolio of the AfDB of US$32.5 billion (end 2014) (US$19.4 non-concessional; 
US$13.1 billion concessional) and the World Bank’s Africa portfolio of US$57.8 billion (US$12.3 
non-concessional and US$44.5 concessional).8
Infrastructure Involvement
Inconsistent reporting and data limitations make detailed evaluation of the infrastructure 
involvement of African NDBs impossible. Even from limited data and general activity descriptions, 
however, it is clear that the majority of NDBs are focused on other sectors of economic activity, 
and do not prioritize infrastructure finance. Most regional NDBs instead support agricultural 
activity (both agro-industry and smaller-scale farming), manufacturing (large-scale and SMEs), 
general commerce, and housing and business construction. Two-thirds of NDBs considered here 
do not invest in infrastructure at all, or have only a minimal participation (20% or less of portfolio 
or annual commitments). 
On the other hand, two of the three largest NDBs in the region—DBSA in South Africa 
and Fonds National d’Investissement in Algeria—focus almost exclusively on infrastructure, 
with over 90% of their portfolio and/or commitments in this sector. The largest NDB, the 
IDC, is also substantially involved in infrastructure with 34% of its new project approvals 
allocated to infrastructure in 2015. Others with substantial involvement in the sector include 
Mozambique’s Banco Nacional de Investimento (85% of portfolio),9 the Development 
Bank of Namibia (55% of annual commitments), Infrastructure Bank of Zimbabwe (40% 
of portfolio), and the Liberian Bank for Development and Investment (36% of portfolio). 
 However, these NDBs have small total portfolios, meaning their total infrastructure activity is 
quite modest. 
In lieu of more solid data, back-of-envelope calculations suggest that roughly US$11 billion 
of the reported US$20 billion in outstanding loan portfolios (from 20 reporting NDBs) are in the 
infrastructure sector. Of that, the vast majority comes from just three NDBs: DBSA and IDC in 
South Africa and Fonds National d’Investissement in Algeria.10
8  Includes all loans to continental Africa, which is for the World Bank divided into two separate regional units: 
“Africa” and “Middle East and North Africa”. 
9  Nigeria’s Infrastructure Bank Plc presumably has a substantial infrastructure portfolio, but data were not avail-
able. 
10  Neither IDC nor Fonds National d’Investissement report its outstanding loans by sector (only annual approvals); 
therefore it is not possible to sum the three NDBs’ outstanding infrastructure portfolio. DBSA’s portfolio amounted 
to US$4.3 billion in 2014. 
5Considering the huge infrastructure gaps in many African countries and the rhetorical priority 
placed by governments on filling these gaps, it may appear surprising that most regional NDBs 
are not more focused on infrastructure provision. However, a number of reasons may help explain 
this situation:- Infrastructure finance requires a degree of expertise in evaluating and helping prepare proj-
ects that many NDBs do not have. In the riskier and less economically developed contexts 
of many African countries, clients require technical assistance to adequately decide if a 
project is viable, and if so, to undertake thorough project preparation. Without this capac-
ity, many potentially high-impact and high-return projects cannot get off the ground.  - Major infrastructure investments require considerable up-front capital that smaller NDBs 
simply cannot afford, particularly combined with the relatively high risk of project failure. 
This would lead to an excessive and risky portfolio concentration in a small number of 
projects, with a high potential for ending up on the government budget in case of problems. 
Larger NDBs operating in more advanced African economies—such as Algeria and South 
Africa—are better able to manage these risks. - Smaller NDBs likely find it more effective and less financially risky to invest resources in 
safer sectors such as commerce, housing construction, small businesses and the like. This 
allows their portfolio to be more diversified across sectors and geographic regions, and 
poses less risk in terms of repayment compared to greenfield infrastructure projects.  - In light of the above, many African countries likely find it more practical to seek external 
financing for infrastructure projects, and direct NDBs to operate in other economic sectors. 
At the same time, this has some drawbacks:
o External resources are limited, and guided in many cases by priorities that do not 
always match those of the local governments. 
o Major development lenders such as the AfDB, World Bank or traditional bilaterals 
sometimes require complex, costly and time-consuming safeguard and procure-
ment procedures that some governments object to and which can delay project 
advancement.
o Other, newer lenders such as Chinese and Indian bilaterals are more likely to use 
country systems, but have been known to impose other restrictions related to labor 
and materials that can limit the development impact of the project. 
Sustainability Criteria
Publicly available material on NDB websites and (where released) annual reports is inadequate 
to make a detailed assessment of how African NDBs employ sustainability criteria in the selection 
6and implementation of projects in general, and specifically in the infrastructure sector. Judging by 
rhetorical emphasis, however, it is evident that environmental and climate considerations are quite 
a low priority for most NDBs in the region. Rather, the focus is clearly on job creation, stimulus to 
non-commodity oriented manufacturing, SMEs, and the agricultural sector. In light of the difficult 
economic contexts in which most banks operate, and the urgent need to stimulate economic activity 
to alleviate very high levels of poverty, this is understandable and to a degree unsurprising. 
Excluding South Africa’s IDC and DBSA (discussed in more detail in the following section), 
only nine of the remaining 27 NDBs make any mention on their website or in the annual report 
of environmental considerations in either selecting which projects to support or how projects are 
implemented. Of these, only three—Botswana Development Corporation, Development Bank of 
Namibia, and Development Bank of Rwanda—offer any sort of detail on sustainability policies.11
In terms of evaluating project environmental impact, the most detail is provided by Development 
Bank of Rwanda, the annual report of which states that all projects approved in 2014 were required 
to produce an environmental evaluation, and that 75% of projects did so (while the remaining 
25% need to complete it during disbursement). For the 15 out of 238 projects considered to be 
“high risk”, the report states that mitigation measures are being undertaken, with no further details 
provided. Both Botswana and Namibia’s NDBs also require environmental evaluation of projects 
considered to have a likely impact, while the Uganda Development Bank states that environmental 
assessments are required, though with no further information. 
In no case do the environmental assessments appear to be made available to the public, and 
no information is publicly available on the criteria or processes used for undertaking them, as is 
commonly the case in the major multilateral development banks. As a result, the public of each 
country appears to have little ability to even obtain information on the environmental impact of its 
NDB activities, much less recourse to ensure adequate mitigation measures. 
Regarding project selection, only Botswana’s NDB gives explicit detail on how environmental 
issues are taken into consideration, including refusing to directly support projects deemed be 
environmentally harmful and giving priority to businesspeople using clean technologies and 
renewable energy.  Other NDBs in Algeria, Ethiopia, Mauritius and Namibia support low-carbon 
technologies by financing renewable energy projects (notably hydro and solar) as well as in the 
case of Algeria a major expansion of the rail transportation network. 
Sources of Funding
One of the key challenges faced by all NDBs is where to access resources for on-lending. The 
11  Development Bank of Zambia states that it is in the process of designing environmental and social safeguard 
policies and monitoring framework, which are to be completed in 2015. 
7characteristics of funding are essential to allow NDBs to successfully undertake their development 
mandate while maintaining financial sustainability. Among the key characteristics are:- Price and maturity. Funding development projects, particularly in less-developed coun-
tries, in many cases requires below-market interest rates, as local market rates are often so 
high as to make projects unviable. Maturity is also an important consideration, as many 
projects—notably infrastructure facilities—require long-term lending, and NDBs must 
protect themselves against asset-liability mismatches and thereby avoid excessive short-
term borrowings.- Stability and scale. An NDB’s ability to undertake a strategy in support of government 
development plans requires a steady flow of resources on which it can depend, to make 
medium-range decisions on lending plans. NDBs also need sufficient quantities of financ-
ing to have meaningful impact. - Non-financial conditions or restrictions. Official financing sources—either directly from 
the government or from external sources—are often attractive in financial terms, but come 
with certain “ties”. Sometimes these are explicit rules on where the resources can be dedi-
cated (especially sectoral allocations, depending on the priorities of the source), or implicit 
political influence. These can hamper the ability of an NDB to effectively achieve develop-
ment goals. 
NDBs have four main sources of financing: i) deposits; ii) government budgets; iii) soft loans 
from external sources; and iv) hard-term financing (bank loans or capital market bond issues). 
Each of these has trade-offs related to the above characteristics. The 17 NDBs in Africa for which 
detailed liability information is available have opted for greatly varying mixes of financing sources, 
depending on a combination of institutional strategy and domestic economic and political realities. 
In terms of share of total funding for all reporting NDBs combined, the largest share comes 
from hard-term lending. This is driven mainly by the two South African banks, DBSA and IDC, 
which are two of the three largest NDBs in Africa and which raise the majority of their resources 
through bank loans or bond issues in the domestic market. This is a realistic option for South 
Africa, due to the depth of its local banking system and capital market. Outside of South Africa, 
this is less feasible due to the very high cost and limited volume of financing available in local 
banking and capital markets. Botswana and Namibia’s development banks also rely on market-
based funding (including nearby South Africa’s capital markets). The Industrial Development and 
Worker’s Bank of Egypt and the very small Development Bank of Seychelles also utilize market-
based funding to a substantial degree. 
The second-largest source for funding is regular direct contributions from owner governments—a 
strategy used heavily or even exclusively by several larger NDBs, including Algeria Fonds National 
8d’Investissement, Angola Banco de Poupança e Crédito, Development Bank of Ethiopia, and Bank 
of Industry (Nigeria). While this has advantages in terms of low financing costs, it also means 
that the NDBs are essentially becoming implementing agencies of governments, which begins 
to undermine the rationale for their existence compared to a line ministry. As well, it opens up 
these NDBs to much more political influence on lending, which can undermine their development 
impact, and is vulnerable to changing government priorities and fiscal health. Such an approach 
can be successful if an NDB is also able to catalyze private sector involvement in a way that line 
ministries cannot, and/or offers a high degree of project expertise.
Many NDBs have also received considerable government resources either via injections of 
new shareholder equity, removal of bad loans from NDB balance sheets, or other techniques not 
listed on the liability side of the balance sheet. Hence, the role of government funding is actually 
considerably larger. As well, the government guarantee—explicit or implicit—on NDB borrowing 
is a further financial support, and should be (but in many cases is not) listed as a contingent liability 
on the government’s accounts. 
Several NDBs—including TIB Bank in Tanzania, Industrial Development 
Bank of Sudan, the Swaziland Development and Savings Bank, the Liberian Bank 
for Development and Investment, and the Industrial Development and Worker’s 
Bank of Egypt—raise 40% or more of their funding via customer deposits.12 
 On the one hand, deposits can recycle a stable pool of local savings at relatively low cost 
(domestic savings accounts frequently pay quite low interest rates) and without the risks and 
conditions associated with external borrowings. They may also result in the banks playing 
a role in promoting financial inclusion. On the other hand, amounts can be limited (especially 
in less developed countries where many citizens have limited savings and are less accustomed 
to using financial institutions). As well, this strategy requires NDBs to develop a retail account 
infrastructure, including branch locations, ATMs and the like, which can be a distraction from the 
NDB’s development mission and unfairly compete with the rest of the banking system (due to the 
implicit or explicit government guarantee). 
A final source of external funds for an NDB includes soft loans from external development 
organizations, frequently bilateral agencies or multilateral development banks. These are often at 
concessional interest rates, which is attractive, but are of limited size and frequently earmarked 
to specific sectors, which can limit an NDB’s operational scope. Almost all NDBs reviewed here 
access some soft loans, but some rely on these resources particularly heavily, such as the Uganda 
Development Bank (68% of liabilities), Development Bank of Seychelles (42%) and Development 
12  Infrastructure Development Bank of Zimbabwe has 57% of it liabilities in deposits, but these are not retail 
customers but rather the deposits of government institutions and official pension funds, meaning these are actually 
back-door government funding. 
9Bank of Rwanda (36%). Many of the smaller NDBs for which data is not available are likely to 
also access substantial soft loans from external development agencies.  
At least three NDBs—Kenya’s Industrial and Commercial Bank Corporation, Banco Nacional 
de Investimento in Mozambique and (to a lesser degree) the Development Bank of Namibia—limit 
their fundraising entirely and rely mainly on equity capital for their operations. This frees the 
NDBs from problems of cost and external influence, but it greatly restricts their operational scale, 
as shareholder equity is limited.
The Industrial Development Corporation13
This case study of the Industrial Development Corporation is divided into three sections. The 
first section reviews the governance structure and financial operations of the IDC. The second 
section discusses the IDC’s activities in regard to infrastructure. The third section describes its 
efforts to make its operations more sustainable.
Governance and Financial Operations14
The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) was created by statute in 1940. Its mandate was 
to develop industrial capacity, particularly manufacturing, in South Africa. Its focus has always 
been on funding and developing the private sector in South Africa. However, it interprets this 
mandate broadly so that it includes funding infrastructure that supports the private sector. In 1990 
its mandate was updated, again by statute, to include industrial development in Africa. It should 
be noted that it is expected that its operations in the rest of Africa will have some link to industrial 
development in South Africa.
The IDC was established as a state owned enterprise and it is still wholly state owned. Thus, 
its only shareholder is the South African government, represented by the Department of Economic 
Development. The Minister of Economic Development appoints the directors of the IDC, who 
can number between 5 and 15. It currently has a 13-member board of directors, of whom 12 
are non-executive directors. The current board includes private business people as well as one 
trade unionist and one representative of government (a senior official in the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry). Formally, the Board appoints the chief executive officer of the IDC but, informally, this 
appointment will need the approval of the Minister of Economic Development. 
The IDC publishes an annual report that complies with current South African 
corporate reporting standards, as set out in the King III Code, a voluntary standard 
13  General information on the IDC is available at: http://www.idc.co.za/ (last visited 15 December 2015). 
14  The information in this section is drawn primarily from the IDC’s annual integrated reports for fiscal years 2014 
and 2015. 
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for good corporate governance used by publicly traded companies in South Africa.15 
 Thus its annual report includes audited financial statements, general information on its operations 
and information on the social, environmental and governance aspects of its operations. Its financial 
statements are audited by independent private auditing firms.
The IDC defines its mission as:16
“The Industrial Development Corporation is a national development finance institution 
whose primary objectives are to contribute to the generation of balanced, sustainable 
economic growth in Africa and to the economic empowerment of the South African 
population, thereby promoting the economic prosperity of all citizens. The IDC achieves 
this by promoting entrepreneurship through the building of competitive industries and 
enterprises based on sound business principles.”
It fulfills this mission by providing debt and equity financing to mining, manufacturing, and 
industrial infrastructure. Its priorities are industrialization and transformation within the context of 
the government’s industrial policy. This means that it gives priority to private sector projects that are 
job creating, projects that create industrial linkages and projects that promote black industrialists, 
women and youth entrepreneurs, and community development. 
The IDC has been fully self-sustaining for a number of years. It had capital and reserves of 
R89.8 billion at the end of fiscal year 2015, of which reserves accounted for about R49 billion. 
This was down from capital and reserves of R106.8 billion in 2014, of which reserves accounted 
for about R68 billion and from capital and reserves of R96.8 billion in 2013. Its total assets at the 
end of FY2015 were R122.3 billion, which was down from R138.6 billion in 2014 and R126.9 
billion in 2013. Its revenue in 2015 was R19.6 billion, which was a 2% decline from revenues 
of R20 billion in 2014. This revenue came from its investments in manufacturing and mining, 
fee income, interest on other investments and dividends from its equity investments. It earned an 
operating profit of R1 billion in 2015, which was down from R2.5 billion in 2014 and 2013. After 
adjusting for additional investment income and taxes, the IDC earned a net profit in 2015 of R1.7 
billion, R1.6 billion in 2014, and R2 billion in 2013.
The IDC funds itself through its capital, retained earnings and debt. In 2015 its 
total debt was R24 billion, up from R21.4 billion in 2014. Domestic borrowing17 
accounted for about R16 billion of this total in 2015 and about R14.9 billion in 2014. About R8.5 
15  The King Code of Corporate Governance for South Africa 2009 (Institute of Directors, Southern Africa) avail-
able at: http://www.ngopulse.org/sites/default/files/king_code_of_governance_for_sa_2009_updated_june_2012.pdf 
(last visited 15 December 2015). King III requires companies to publish integrated reports that address environmen-
tal, social and governance issues as well as financial issues. 
16  IDC Corporate Profile 2014, available at: http://www.idc.co.za/ir2014/introducing-the-idc (last visited 15 De-
cember 2015). 
17  The IDC has been rated as Baa2 by Moody’s and AA+ by Fitch. 
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billion was raised through three, five and ten year bonds, issued on the South African domestic 
bond market. These included bonds placed to fund green initiatives with the Public Investment 
Corporation (total about R2 billion) and with the Unemployment Insurance Fund to fund job-
creating projects (total about R4 billion) and a public bond valued at R2.5 billion. The remaining 
funds were borrowed from domestic financial institutions. In addition, the IDC continues to borrow 
from its “traditional” external sources, which include other development financing institutions, such 
as Proparco, African Development Bank, KfW, Agence Francaise de Developpement, European 
Investment Bank, China Development Bank, and commercial banks. Approximately R8 billion 
was raised from these sources in 2015 and about R6.4 billion in 2014. Overall, its debt/equity ratio 
deteriorated from 20.1% in 2014 to 26.8% in 2015. 
During FY 2015, the IDC, which has 825 employees, approved funding of R11.5 billion 
(R11.1 billion in 2014), and its disbursements were R10.9 billion (R11.1 billion in 2014), of which 
46% were in manufacturing, 34% infrastructure and 20% mining. Total loans and advances were 
equal to R22.4 billion, net of repayments, in 2015 and total investments, net of equity divestments 
and preferential share redemptions, were R28.2 billion in 2015 (the respective totals in 2014 were 
R20.8 billion and R28.1 billion). In FY 2015, the IDC approved 210 transactions (up from 196 in 
FY 2014).
While the IDC remains financially sound and profitable, it is experiencing some financial 
challenges. Its level of impairments has increased from R5.4 billion in 2011 to R10.2 billion 
in 2015. Non-performing loans increased from R4.7 billion in 2014 to R5.4 billion in 2015, an 
increase of 16%. Despite this increase, non-performing loans have remained at about 22% of the 
total loan book for the last three years, due to the overall growth of the portfolio. On the other hand 
the IDC’s written off debt increased from R519 million in 2014 to R1.4 billion in 2015, mainly 
due to problems in the textile and forestry sectors. 
During FY2015, the IDC improved its efficiency.  In FY 2015, according to its 2015 annual 
report, its goal was to reduce its administrative costs (including grants and donations and excluding 
impairments) from 77% of its net interest, fee income and dividends to 67%. In the end it actually 
managed to reduce the ratio to 50.9%.  It also improved the turn-around time for transactions from 
17 working days to 14.3 working days. 
IDC and Sustainable Infrastructure
The IDC has an expansive definition of infrastructure because it classifies infrastructure and 
services together.18 The result is that the R3.9 billion invested in 2015 in infrastructure consists of 
18  See Section 5, IDC 2015 Annual Report, for information on the IDC’s investment in infrastructure and services, 
available at: http://www.idc.co.za/ir2015/material-matters/impacting-on-industrial-development (last visited 15 
December 2015). 
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media and motion pictures and recreational activities (R150 million); hospital activities (R209 
million); waste recycling (R137 million), wholesale, retail and business services (R115 million); 
telecom (R86 million); transport and warehousing (R497 million); monetary intermediation (R491 
million); tourism facilities (R129 million); construction (R29 million); production and distribution 
of electricity, gas and water (R2 billion).  
The IDC has two dedicated infrastructure policy units which report to both the Presidential 
Infrastructure Coordinating Committee (PICC) and to the IDC Board and Executive Committee. 
These units are responsible for fulfilling the IDC’s role as the coordinating agency for two strategic 
infrastructure projects, the Saldanha-Northern Cape Development Corridor, and the development 
of initiatives aimed at greening the local economy, and for identifying local industrial development 
opportunities across the 18 projects identified as strategic infrastructure projects by the PICC.
The IDC is active in promoting green industry and green energy. Its total green energy portfolio 
is valued at over R15 billion. This consists of a R500 million Green Energy Efficient Fund, which 
is now 39% committed; renewable energy (R12.9 billion/81% of the total) energy efficiency (R0.4 
billion/3%) fuel based energy (R1.2 billion/7%), and biofuels (R1.4 billion/9%). It has participated 
actively in South Africa’s Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers Programme (REIPPP), 
which to date has involved three rounds of project authorizations. This programme is aimed at 
increasing the use of renewable sources of energy, primarily solar and wind energy, in South 
Africa’s energy mix and at providing a way to incorporate the private sector in the generation of 
power in South Africa. 
Overall, the IDC has participated in a total of 22 successful projects during REIPPP rounds 
1, 2 and 3. These projects, when completed will produce a total of 1,408 MW of power. It should 
be noted that the IDC’s participation in REIPP declined significantly in 2015. Its total investment 
in REIPPP over five years has been R14 billion, of which only R348 million was invested in 
2015 versus R6.6 billion in 2014, R2 billion in 2013 and about R4.5 billion in 2012. The funding 
for IDC’s participation in the REIPPP was supported by the green bond issued to the Public 
Investment Corporation, which was ring-fenced for this purpose. One reason for the decline in 
IDC participation in round 3 of REIPPP was that it had less funds available after participating in 
the first two rounds. However, this decline is also consistent with the IDC strategy of helping start 
new and innovative activities and then withdrawing from them as the private sector takes over the 
activity. 
Although, the IDC is withdrawing from funding the REIPPP, its participation in renewable 
energy has not declined. It is also participating in 14 projects that are part of the government’s 
small IPP programme, which involves renewable energy projects with a capacity of 1-5 MW. 
In addition, the IDC is participating in non-REIPPP energy projects with a combined installed 
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capacity of 1,265 MW across solar photo-voltaic, wind, hydro power and concentrated solar. This 
includes two concentrated solar projects under construction in the Northern Cape Province, which 
will contribute towards local economic upliftment. It is also involved in biogas, waste-to energy 
and cogeneration projects.  
It is important to note that all renewable energy projects include local communities as 
shareholders through community trusts in which they hold equity. The community trust receives 
dividends over 20 years and is responsible for investing this for the benefit of community. The 
IDC also works to educate the community about how to manage this investment and to effectively 
utilize the dividends for the development of the community (see Box 1). 
Another area in which IDC has been active is information and communication technologies, 
including broadband infrastructure, digital migration, e-waste and demand side management, and 
electronics. For example, it is supporting a wireless and broadband infrastructure project in Soweto.
The IDC is an active investor in infrastructure projects in the rest of the African continent, with 
total exposure of R7.5 billion in 60 projects in 20 countries. These projects are chosen on the basis 
of their economic merit and their developmental impact on the host country and on South Africa. 
This means that these projects should promote procurement of South African goods and services. 
Examples of the projects being supported by the IDC are: infrastructure projects in Ghana (power 
generation, telecoms), Kenya (power generation). Mozambique (power generation), Namibia 
(power generation), Nigeria (telecom), Senegal (airport and seaport), Sudan (water infrastructure), 
Uganda (infrastructure), Zambia (coal-fired power plant), and Zimbabwe (telecoms). These projects 
have experienced significant challenges including slow uptake by South African companies on the 
procurement opportunities, cost overruns, and implementation problems. The IDC has also had a 
problem identifying bankable projects across the continent. 
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Box 1. Community Trusts at IDC and DBSA: Using Finance to Build Community Support
Both IDC and DBSA are incorporating a unique financial mechanism into their REIPPP projects: 
community trusts. The trusts give communities where projects are being built a stake in their 
success, by helping finance the purchase of an equity share of the project for the community. 
The trusts have the potential to engender broader social support for the project among the local 
population—thus limiting potential social conflict that could undermine project success—as well 
as to generate financial revenue for the community that can be used to address social needs. 
Although the community trusts are at an early stage of implementation in South Africa, they could 
provide a useful model for other NDBs, particularly those operating in sectors or regions that 
have experienced social tensions around infrastructure projects in the past. 
The basic principle is that a local community where a project is planned creates a trust, for which 
the community itself is the sole beneficiary. When IDC or DBSA provides financing for an REIPPP 
project, at the same time it makes a loan to the community trust for the purchase of a modest 
equity stake in the project. The loan has a grace period covering the time needed to get the power 
facility built and operating, and then most of the revenue the trust receives when the facility is 
operational is used to pay off the loan. When the loan is repaid, further revenue goes to the trust 
and can be used as the community chooses. 
IDC provided details of a typical community trust arrangement, which is similar to the 
arrangements used by DBSA. The terms of the IDC community trust loan is 17 years, even though 
the power purchase agreements (PPA) associated with the REIPPP projects have a life of 20 years. 
The community trust is required to pay the IDC 80-90% of the revenue stream that the community 
trust receives from the project. Thus, the community gets 10-20% of the revenue stream from the 
time the project begins generating a revenue stream. If all goes to plan, IDC will have been fully 
repaid by year 17 and the community will receive 100% of its share of revenues, corresponding 
to its equity stake, generated in years 17-20 of the PPA. It should be noted that the expected life 
of a REIPPP project is 30 years. Thus, assuming the PPA is renewed, the community will also get 
another 10 years of revenues.  
To date, only some of the round 1 REIPPP projects are operational. They have been operating 
for 1-2 years and so a well-developed record of how the community trusts function is not yet 
available. Nonetheless, a DBSA senior staffer indicated that DBSA intends to continue using the 
trust model moving forward, including in projects beyond REIPPP. 
One important issue for an NDB is to impose sufficient safeguards to protect its financial 
commitment, without unduly burdening the beneficiary community. The NDB will need to strike 
this delicate balance in dealing with the risk of non-payment arising from two situations. The 
first is if the project fails, and the community’s equity in the project becomes worthless. In this 
situation, the NDB will have limited or no ability to oblige the community to repay the original 
loan. The second risk is that the project, during its first 17 years of operations, generates less 
revenue than anticipated so that the community derives no or less benefit from its investment 
than it expected but the NDB continues to receive most of all of its expected repayment.  This will 
create a sensitive reputational problem for the NDB and, unless addressed in the loan agreement 
may result in the NDB being forced to restructure the loan.  One way to mitigate these risks is a 
thorough evaluation of the project’s viability in the first place.
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The IDC’s Approach to Sustainability19
Sustainability is an important consideration for the IDC because it seeks to act consistently 
with government policy, which includes promoting the green economy. Thus the IDC will factor 
sustainability considerations into its decision on which projects to support. The IDC views 
sustainability as “economic and social development that does not erode social and environmental 
value.”20 It recognizes that failure to act effectively to address these issues can have negative 
reputational consequences.  
Based on its mandate, the IDC considers a range of factors in its decision making process. 
In addition to a concern with enhancing economic and financial capital, the IDC is interested 
in enhancing human capital in its business partners, natural capital by reducing the negative 
impact of its operations on the environment and by promoting environmental stewardship to its 
business partners, and social capital through promoting effective governance and ethical conduct, 
customer satisfaction and community spending in line with the developmental priorities of the 
country. This means that among the issues it considers in assessing projects are the amount of 
local content in project inputs, job creation and the extent to which the ownership of the project 
includes historically disadvantaged individuals and communities. In addition, it seeks to mitigate 
the social and environmental risks associated with its projects through stakeholder engagement, 
its environmental health and safety procedures and its monitoring of the social and environmental 
impacts of the project. Given the range of factors that the IDC considers in making a decision 
on which projects to support, it is difficult to ascertain exactly how much attention is given to 
sustainability considerations. It has been suggested that these considerations are more likely to 
affect the pricing of the IDC’s funding for the project rather than the decision of whether to fund 
or not. However, we have not been able to find evidence to either support or refute this contention. 
The IDC has a small environmental and social unit (ESU), consisting of six full time staff 
members and two interns, tasked with assessing the social and environmental impact of its 
operations. It uses an environmental and social framework to screen for risks such as human rights, 
social and community issues, energy and water. The framework is applicable to both pre-investment 
due diligence and to post-investment monitoring of projects. The framework involves a check list 
of risks like child labour, HIV, community impact, retrenchment policies, biodiversity, energy, 
water and air pollution. The IDC utilizes this check list in doing its due diligence assessments 
of projects. In addition, it uses the list in its annual assessment of its clients’ compliance with 
environmental and social requirements. The ESU uses a four-point scale in which 1 is excellent 
and 4 is breach of obligations to IDC in applying the framework. In its most recent assessment, 
19  The information in this section is based on the IDC’s integrated annual reports for FY2014 and 2015 and inter-
views with IDC staff. 
20  2014 Integrated Report, p. 95, available at: http://www.idc.co.za/ir2014/images/pdf/ar2014.pdf (last visited 15 
December 2015).
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54 of its 60 clients received good ratings and six required remedial action. The work in this area 
is overseen by the board’s Risk and Sustainability committee. It also follows GRI guideline 4 in 
preparing its integrated report, which also complies with King III rules. 
It should be noted that the IDC is working to incorporate sustainability considerations into all 
aspects of its operations, including the approval process. The approval process begins with a project 
assessment, which involves an extensive due diligence. Since the IDC provides equity financing 
to start ups for which debt is not yet an option through to projects that are only looking for debt 
financing, an important consideration in the due diligence is an assessment of the economic merit 
of the venture. This involves assessing the technology to be used in the venture, the market for 
the venture, its management, governance arrangements, the economic and financial case for the 
venture, its legal risks, as well as the environmental health and safety aspects of the project and the 
extent to which it meets the IDC’s transformation concerns. 
Depending on the size of the project, the due diligence may involve consultations with outside 
stakeholders.  In 2014, the IDC developed and began implementing a stakeholder engagement 
strategy.  In this strategy it identified the following as its key stakeholders:  the Minister of Economic 
Development, its sole shareholder; Board of Directors; employees; clients; subsidiaries and 
associates; national, provincial and local government departments; general public and the media; 
co-investors and co-funders in its operations, and funders to the IDC; industry bodies, associations 
and chambers of commerce; other state-owned enterprises; regulatory bodies; communities, NGOs 
and academic institutions. The strategy requires managers to submit reports every six months on 
their stakeholder engagements. 
The due diligence study, depending on the size and importance of the project will involve a 
number of different reports that will be developed by a team of IDC officials, including officials 
from the sustainability division. These reports will be submitted to a series of IDC management 
and board level committees with the level of the decision making committee depending on the 
size and significance of the project. Thus, the project reports, which will have been prepared by 
all divisions involved with the project plus the overall report prepared by the project champion, 
will be submitted to a Credit Committee, which consists of senior management officials, including 
from the sustainability division. This committee will review the reports and, if the project falls 
within their mandate, make a decision on whether to invest or not. If it exceeds their mandate, they 
will refer the project reports with their recommendation to the Special Credit Committee, which 
consists of the IDC executive, including the executive responsible for sustainability, and some 
outside parties.  If the project falls within the mandate of the Special Credit Committee, they will 
make a decision on whether to fund the project or not. Once again sustainability considerations 
can be raised in the decision-making process. Finally, for the largest and most significant projects, 
the Special Credit Committee will submit the reports and their recommendation to the Board 
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Investment Committee, which will make the final decision. 
Once the decision is taken to support the project, the IDC will negotiate the necessary contracts 
with the client. These contracts will contain both pre-conditions and covenants to deal with the 
various aspects of the project including sustainability considerations. 
It should be noted that the IDC is concerned with promoting ethical conduct in all its operations. 
As a result, the following board committees are all involved in ensuring that its operations comply 
with high ethical standards: Investment, Human Capital and Nominations; Audit; Risk and 
Sustainability; Governance and Ethics. It should also be noted that the IDC does not have different 
approval processes for South African projects and projects in the rest of Africa. However, risk 
profiles and assessments of projects may lead to different outcomes for similar projects based on 
the location of the project. 
The IDC is not a signatory to any of the existing standards applicable to project financing, 
such as the Equator Principles. However, it is a member of the UNEP-Finance Initiative (http://
www.unepfi.org/), which is a global network of financial institutions seeking to better understand 
the impact of social and environmental factors on financial performance, and of the Association of 
African Development Financing Institutions (http://www.adfi-ci.org/). It is required to comply with 
the AADFI’s Prudential Standards and Guidelines for Development Financing Institutions and any 
other standards that it may develop.  It is important to note that that the Prudential Standards do not 
deal with the issue of sustainability in any significant detail.  
Development Bank of Southern Africa
The Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) was established in 1983, and is fully 
owned by the South African government. It was first created during the apartheid era, and its basic 
statutes and mission were overhauled in 1997 through new legislation as part of the transition to 
democratic rule in South Africa. DBSA is unusual among NDBs in its very strong focus on basic 
infrastructure.
The bank’s primary mission is to promote infrastructure development in South Africa and, 
secondarily, to the countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).21 More 
specifically, DBSA focuses on providing financial support to expand i) social infrastructure (the 
delivery of basic services) and ii) economic infrastructure (to eliminate capacity constraints 
and optimize economic growth potential).22 Lending is focused primarily on South Africa’s 283 
municipalities, public utilities, and state-controlled entities in other SADC countries. 
21  The SADC currently has 14 members apart from South Africa: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. 
22  Website, http://www.dbsa.org/EN/About-Us/Pages/About-Us.aspx (last visited 18 December 2015).
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By assets, DBSA is roughly one-third the size of the country’s largest bank, and it is not among 
the top five banks in South Africa. DBSA’s portfolio accounted for less than 5% of South Africa 
banking system assets in 2013.23 As a result of a sharp downtown in financial results in 2011-2013, 
DBSA received its first capital injection from the government since 1994, and has undertaken a 
major restructuring of its operations. 
Governance and Financial Operations
The DBSA is fully government-owned, and the sitting Minister of Finance serves as governor 
of the bank. The bank’s board has 13 members, of which five are currently from DBSA itself, five 
from the private sector, one a union leader, one academic and one the head of an urban non-profit.24 
DBSA’s annual borrowing plan must be submitted to the National Treasury for approval, and it 
has statutory restrictions on capitalization (equity-to-loans minimum of 28.6%) and borrowing 
(maximum 2.5 times shareholder equity). The bank had 459 permanent contract employees as of 
March 2015, as well as 88 fixed-term contractors. 
DBSA’s development financing portfolio has nearly quadrupled in the last ten years, rising 
from R16.3 billion in 2004/05 to R63.1 billion in 2014/15—an impressive operational expansion, 
and testament to the South African government’s view of DBSA as a key tool in promoting its 
development agenda.25 The bulk of development operations—90% in 2014/15—are comprised of 
development loans, while 8% is in equity investments for developmental purposes and a further 
2% in development-oriented bonds. The majority of the recent operational expansion is due to 
lending, although equity investments have also grown very considerably (over six times in the 
last ten year), albeit from a very low base (Figure 1). The use of development bonds—to support 
municipal investments while at the same time promoting domestic capital market deepening 
and improved municipal access—began just two years ago, and remains small although with 
considerable growth potential. 
23  Standard and Poor’s, 2013a, p. 6.
24  DBSA Annual Report 2013.
25  Unless otherwise noted, all data taken from DBSA annual reports, which reports based on a fiscal year ending on 
March 31. All numbers are in current rand.
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Figure 1. DBSA Development Finance Portfolio, 2004/05-2014/15
Source: 2004/05-2014/15 annual reports.
The portfolio expanded rapidly in the mid-200s through 2008/09, and then growth slowed 
considerably through 2012/13 (Figure 2). This was in part due a natural tapering back in the 
aftermath of global crisis, and also because of financial difficulties faced by DBSA due to poor 
investment choices (both loans and equity investments) during its earlier expansion. Following 
an operational and financial retrenchment beginning in 2012/13, as well as an injection of fresh 
government capital (R8.7 billion as of March 2015, with another R3 billion committed in 2015/16), 
DBSA operations began expanding again at a faster rate in 2013/14 and 2014/15. 
Figure 2. Percentage Annual Loan Portfolio Change, 2004/05-2014/15
Source: 2004/05-2014/15 annual reports.
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for the provision of basic infrastructure services. Municipalities and public utilities together 
accounted for just over two-thirds of the total outstanding portfolio in 2013, with 27.6% dedicated 
to private sector clients and the remainder to provincial and national governments, development 
finance institutions in SADC countries, and education institutions (Figure 3). The rationale for 
the strong focus on municipalities is to overcome the lack of long-term commercial financing 
options for most of the 283 municipalities in South Africa, as well as local governments in SADC 
countries. Two-thirds of DBSA loans are for four years or longer, which is appropriate for its 
emphasis on long-term infrastructure projects (Figure 4). 
Figure 3. Client Distribution of DBSA      Figure 4. Maturity Structure of 
Portfolio, 2014/15              DBSA Loan Portfolio, 2014/15
 
Source: 2014/15 DBSA Annual Report. 
Originally designed to operate solely in South Africa and the apartheid-era “homelands” (in 
South Africa and present-day Namibia), DBSA broadened its scope for operations to the countries 
of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1997. Despite its formal link to 
the SADC in DBSA’s legislation, the other countries receiving DBSA financing have no say in 
the bank’s governance.26 By statute, not more than one-third of total lending is allowed outside of 
South Africa, with the 2014/15 level at 25% divided among 12 countries. Zambia has the largest 
portfolio of SADC loans (30% of total), followed by Angola and Zimbabwe (20% each). Operations 
outside of South Africa do not require a guarantee of the host country government, nor does DBSA 
have preferred creditor status. Unlike operations within South Africa, financing in other SADC 
countries are intended to support mainly commercially viable projects. 
DBSA relies heavily on issuing debt in capital markets to raise funds for lending—70.5% of 
total liabilities in 2014/15—with the remainder coming from official credit lines (26.6%) and other 
sources (3.9%). Although DBSA does not release details of its bond placements, the vast majority 
is within the South African market rather than abroad. It is rated BBB+ for local currency issues 
by Standard and Poor’s, meaning its cost of funding is relatively high compared to NDBs that 
26  Qobo and Motsamai (2014) argue that this can undercut the legitimacy of DBSA’s international activity and may 
lead borrowers in other countries to perceive it as an instrument of South Africa’s efforts to dominate the region. 
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either have a better rating or can rely on other sources of financing apart from capital markets. 
The majority of foreign currency funding (for SADC lending and domestic projects requiring 
imports) comes from credit lines from external DFIs at below-market rates, and credit lines from 
commercial banks. Unlike some NDBs in Africa and elsewhere, DBSA does not take deposits. 
DBSA has not actively sought out opportunities in the developing market for green bonds, 
although senior management interviews indicate that the bank is watching developments in this 
market and may consider an issue going forward if conditions merit. With the green bond market 
growing quickly—from just over US$10 billion in issues in 2013 to US$36.6 billion in 2014 and a 
projected US$40 billion in 201527—this could be an attractive means for DBSA to diversify funding 
sources and bring down costs for sustainable infrastructure projects. However, the currently fragile 
bond market rating for both DBSA and the South African government (a notch above junk bond 
status by Standard and Poor’s for international issues) means that conditions are unlikely to be 
appropriate for such a funding strategy in the near term. 
Apart from its own resources, DBSA also implements two major funds, the Green Fund and 
the Infrastructure Investment Programme for South Africa (IIPSA). The Green Fund, founded in 
2013, is funded directly from the government budget, with a dedicated total amount of R1.1 billion 
(US$72 million) to be implemented by 2018.28 Green Fund resources are disbursed in grants, loans 
and equity, with financial terms depending on the project. While highly positive for promoting 
sustainable infrastructure initiatives, the Green Fund is limited by its resources to small projects 
that may have an important impact at the level of individual communities but not at the national 
level. IIPSA is a joint initiative by the European Union and the South African government, which 
blends EU grant resources with funding from South African and international development finance 
institutions to support infrastructure development in southern Africa. IIPSA was announced in 
2014 for a total of €100 million. Of 27 projects accepted into the IIPSA pipeline as of March 
2015, eight have been shortlisted for due diligence and appraisals have been completed on six, of 
which five have been recommended for funding. Due diligence is continuing for the remaining 19 
projects. 
Going forward, DBSA will channel resources from the Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
into projects in South Africa as well as other countries where DBSA operates. DBSA was formally 
accredited as a GEF Project Agency in October 2014—as of this writing, the only national 
development bank to receive such accreditation.29 The level of resources that will be channeled by 
GEF via DBSA will be contingent on the success of DBSA and end clients in developing projects 
that meet GEF criteria, as well as the GEF’s own financing availability and strategic priorities. To 
27  Bloomberg, 2015.
28  Republic of South Africa, 2015. 
29  See https://www.thegef.org/gef/agencies_accreditation (last visited 12 January 2016).
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provide a sense of scale, GEF approved US$1.18 billion in projects in FY2014 around the globe, 
of which only a small portion (US$44.1 million) was dedicated to South Africa.30 
DBSA and Sustainable Infrastructure
DBSA places a very high priority on infrastructure, with nearly 90% of the loan portfolio 
directed to this area (Figure 5). Within the infrastructure category, DBSA places a strong 
emphasis on energy generation (just over half of the portfolio), followed closely by transport and 
communications. In 2014/15, over 80% of DBSA’s infrastructure loans emphasize energy and 
transport, with about 16% going to water and social projects (Figure 6). This is a change from 
2006, when over half of lending was for water and social projects, indicating a shift in recent years 
from addressing the social legacy of apartheid toward promoting the underpinnings of economic 
growth. According to the 2014/15 annual report, DBSA lending will “evolve over the next 20 
years towards the transport and water security segments.”31
Figure 5. Sectoral Distribution of            Figure 6. Breakdown of DBSA 
DBSA Loan Portfolio, 2014/15                  Infrastructure Portfolio, 2014/15
  
Source: 2014/15 financial statements.
According to DBSA’s most recent annual report, the “The Bank is legally obliged to promote 
sustainable development through its operations and this is integrated into the Bank’s strategy…” 
(2014/15, p. 99). To fulfill this mandate in its lending operations, DBSA works together with 
the South African Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) and the National Treasury in 
designing its operational plans in line with the national development strategy. At the same time, 
sustainability concerns are clearly only one of several goals of the South African government and—
by extension—DBSA, which also prioritizes economic growth, job creation, expanded access to 
basic social services and reducing inequality, among others.32 DBSA has no specific targets on 
30  GEF Project Database.
31  Annual report 2014/15, p. 106. 
32  For more details see National Development Plan 2030: Our future - make it work, 15 August 2012. 
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sustainable versus non-sustainable infrastructure in its project selection criteria.33 
Although detailed, project-by-project data are not available, DBSA did provide data34 on 
the share of its 2014/15 activities that can be classified as “green,” according to the definition 
used by the International Development Finance Club (IDFC).35 Out of a total of US$1.6 billion 
in commitments of all types in 2014/15, US$434 million (27%) met IDFC’s definition of green 
financing. Of that, the vast majority was for lending within South Africa (US$396 million), with 
only a small share (US$38 million) in other SADC countries. Almost the entirety of the green 
financing was for renewable energy generation projects (US$425 million), while a small amount 
(US$8 million) was for climate change adaptation projects. 
Energy generation is a top priority for DBSA, as described in the previous section, and 
lending out of its own resources in this sector is directed to two sets of clients: municipal and 
non-municipal. Municipal lending is focused is entirely on improving connectivity to the grid and 
upgrading transmission facilities. Non-municipal lending, on the other hand, is mainly directed 
toward grid and non-grid electricity generation, and thus has a very high sustainability component. 
Although DBSA did support a substantial degree of renewable energy generation in 2014/15 
(projects capable of generating 975 MW), the vast majority was directed toward coal-fired power 
plants (9000 MW) and a smaller amount to gas-fired plants (340 MW), both within South Africa 
and in SADC countries. 
While the above numbers clearly highlight the priority DBSA places on generation over 
sustainability concerns—arguably understandable in light of the country’s pressing needs—the 
bank has made considerable effort to increase its participation in renewables. DBSA (as well 
as IDC) has been active in supporting the government’s Renewable Energy Independent Power 
Producers Procurement (REIPPP) program in support of private sector investment in biomass, 
solar, wind and small-scale hydro energy generation facilities. DBSA has helped design project 
proposals for 3,625 MW of renewable energy, and has committed debt and equity to some projects. 
For example, DBSA provided nearly 25% of the financing for a major new greenfield solar project, 
!Ka XU Solar One, with 100 MW net power generating capacity. 
REIPPP has been considered a significant success as a program to support the expansion of 
renewable energy generation in South Africa,36 but the role of DBSA has come up for some criticism. 
According to the director of a renewable energy investment company in South Africa, DBSA and 
IDC both participated as debt and equity financers in the first two bidding rounds, but since that 
time investors have preferred to seek financing from other sources, as DBSA in particular was 
33  Interviews, DBSA staff. 
34  Personal communication with authors.
35  See IDFC 2015, Annex C.
36  See for example Eberhard et al., 2014. 
24
viewed as a difficult transaction partner in terms of bureaucratic requirements, lack of business 
approach and limited technical know-how in the field, combined with relatively high financing 
costs. As a result, DBSA has been less active in more recent bidding rounds, despite pressing 
need for support by smaller local investors facing difficulties competing with large international 
investors able to finance projects externally or from their own balance sheets. IDC has somewhat 
refocused on supporting local renewable energy component manufacturing facilities as opposed 
to generation itself (see IDC and Sustainable Infrastructure sub-section above for details), while 
DBSA had yet to find a meaningful role and was still putting itself forward mainly as a direct 
financer, with limited success. 
Lastly, DBSA implements the R1.1 billion government-funded Green Fund, established in 
2013 to support South Africa’s transition to a green economy. By end-2014, R738 million had 
been approved for 48 separate projects, including investment, training and research projects. As of 
August 2015, 19 were investment projects had been approved, of which about R250 million was 
in the area of renewable energy and energy efficiency, and the remainder in sustainable natural 
resource use, waste management and environmentally-friendly manufacturing.
The bulk of DBSA’s investment in transport infrastructure in 2014/15 appears from available 
information to be conventional, with little explicit sustainability content beyond the requirements 
of the bank’s safeguard procedures (see below). One exception is a substantial investment (R786 
million) in a major urban transit project, supporting the purchase of 40 natural gas and 131 diesel 
buses for the Tshwane Rapid Transit project. The project is part of the government’s broader Public 
Transport Strategy, calling for a major expansion of public transport networks by 2020. Also in 
this area, DBSA has supported the completion of three municipal master plans in 2014/15, which 
have major sustainability components, particularly in transportation. DBSA further supported 
sustainable infrastructure through the government-funded Green Fund in the areas of water and 
sanitation (R100 million), green buildings (R70 million), rural and land use projects (R75 million) 
and biodiversity (R70 million) since its inception in 2013.
One key issue facing DBSA in its efforts to support sustainable infrastructure is the relatively 
high price of loans it can offer. Based on its financing model—accessing resources mainly in a 
highly competitive local capital market—DBSA has a fairly high cost of funding, which it must 
pass on to borrowers to remain financially viable. This is particularly problematic in the case 
of shorter-term financing (where DBSA competes with private banks that take deposits) and in 
lending to countries outside of South Africa, where DBSA must fund itself in dollars. Within South 
Africa, DBSA is reasonably price-competitive on longer-term financing with private sources, but 
it is also slower and comes with more requirements on its loans, which dampens demand for its 
services.
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As one example, DBSA had sought to finance a rapid transit project not only in Tshwane (as 
noted above) but also in Johannesburg, but the latter city elected to go with a different financing 
source mainly due to pricing and bureaucracy issues. DBSA attempts to ease this constraint via 
accessing lower-cost international cooperation resources in its funding mix. Despite these efforts, 
DBSA remains more of a “taker” as opposed to a market maker, in need of finding financially 
viable projects that meet its development mandate and with demand for DBSA financing. This 
restricts its ability to pro-actively promote sustainable infrastructure. 
A second critical limitation for DBSA—as with many other national and multilateral 
development banks—is the lack of finance-ready projects to support, owing to lack of capacity 
in project design on the part of potential borrowers (mainly municipal governments in South 
Africa and regional countries). To address this bottleneck, the European Union in 2014 provided 
100 million euros to create the Infrastructure Investment Programme for South Africa (IIPSA), 
managed by DBSA. IIPSA provides grant funding for infrastructure project preparation in 
South Africa as well as the SADC region. Although not specifically earmarked for sustainable 
infrastructure, the fund has already proved useful in supporting sustainable projects move from 
concept to implementation, for example the Buffalo City solar project. 
DBSA’s Approach to Sustainability
DBSA has had policies and procedures in place to appraise the environmental impact of 
projects for at least 20 years,37 but these have been revised substantially in the last two years, in 
large measure as part of DBSA’s application to become an accredited project agency with the 
Global Environmental Facility. As stated in the most recent update of its Environmental and Social 
Safeguard Standards (ESSS), “As a GEF project agent, the DBSA is required to meet minimum 
fiduciary and environmental and social safeguard standards. This document, the Environmental 
and Social Safeguard Standards, sets out how the DBSA intends to comply with these standards 
and what it requires of its clients.” (DBSA 2015, p. 9). 
The new ESSS is explicitly modeled on the approach utilized by many of the major multilateral 
development banks, notably the World Bank, International Finance Corporation, and African 
Development Bank, and contains a suite of seven safeguards as well as labor standards. The 
first “umbrella” safeguard is the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA), to be 
undertaken for all projects deemed to potentially have environmental or social impacts. Other 
safeguards (natural habitats, involuntary resettlement, community stakeholders and vulnerable 
groups, pest management, physical and cultural resources, safety of dams and labor standards) are 
applied as determined by the results of the initial assessment. The aim of the ESIA is to ensure that 
“issues of climate change mitigation and adaptation, social equity and ecosystem enhancement are 
37  According to the “SADC Environmental Legislation Handbook 2012”, p. 31.
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more thoroughly and appropriately addressed,” (DBSA 2015, p. 17), and it does so with specific 
procedures designed to avoid or mitigate impacts, manage risks, and permit stakeholders adequate 
project information and opportunity to engage. 
The ESIA begins with a two-part initial screening required for all projects funded directly by 
DBSA as well as those supported via financial intermediaries. The first component assesses the 
likely greenhouse gas and carbon footprint of a project, while the second (more binding) component 
categorizes the project according to environmental and social risk. Similar to the World Bank, 
DBSA uses four categories: high, medium and low risks, and projects undertaken by financial 
intermediaries (4). The subsequent steps taken during project appraisal and preparation depend on 
the category assigned during the screening process, as follows:
- Category 1 (high risk): Full environmental scoping, a full Environmental and Social Im-
pact Analysis (ESIA) and detailed Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP) in 
all cases. These must be reviewed and approved by DBSA and also by the relevant govern-
ment departments prior to project approval and disbursement. Projects must also disclose 
their carbon footprint, and climate change must be mainstreamed into the ESIA and ESMP, 
including mitigation and adaptation measures. 
- Category 2 (medium risk): Can have full or basic (simplified) ESIA, depending on DBSA 
judgment. ESMP is reviewed by DBSA, and (at DBSA’s discretion) the relevant govern-
ment department. 
- Category 3 (low risk): ESIA and full ESMP not required, but may at judgment of DBSA 
require a basic ESMP to be reviewed by DBSA (but not the government).
- Category 4 (financial intermediary): Subprojects face same requirements for Category 1 
and 2. If high-risk investment is known at time of approval, than the overall loan is Cat-
egory 1. DBSA must carry out due diligence on financial intermediary to assess capacity 
prior to approval in all cases. 
While the new DBSA safeguards are quite rigorous on paper, their implementation is still in 
its infancy, as the policy was only recently overhauled. The current organizational framework 
at DBSA indicates that although the policy is a clear improvement, the safeguards specialists 
themselves do not have authority to halt projects. Rather, specialists join onto appraisal teams led 
by finance units (either South Africa Finance or International Finance, depending on the location of 
the project), and contribute their assessments to i) the early review report and subsequently ii) the 
detailed appraisal report, both of which are under the authority of the finance teams. These reports, 
in turn, are submitted to DBSA’s Investment Committee, which decides whether to proceed with 
the project and (depending on project amount) submit to board for final approval. DBSA currently 
has a permanent staff of five environmental safeguard specialists and three social safeguard 
specialists—a small staff for the number of projects DBSA processes and tracks each year. 
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Conclusions
This survey of African NDBs and the detailed case studies of the DBSA and the IDC lead to 
four conclusions about the role of NDBs in financing sustainable infrastructure. 
First, African NDBs, including IDC and DBSA, do not have clear operational priorities and 
policies promoting sustainable infrastructure. While both the South African NDBs as well as 
several others in the continent state that sustainability is a top priority, that has not translated 
into concrete policies guiding their investment decisions, such as specific targets for certain 
sectors or mechanisms incentivizing staff to promote sustainable projects. In the case of both 
these institutions, and in African NDBs more generally, the decision on whether to fund particular 
infrastructure projects appear to be driven by a range of factors, of which sustainability is only one. 
In most cases, the NDBs are clearly more concerned with supporting projects that will lead to job 
creation and economic growth than with sustainability. 
The lack of a sharp focus on sustainability is further evidence by the fact that neither case study 
NDBs have a clear definition to distinguish between sustainable and non-sustainable infrastructure, 
nor do they report their level of sustainable vs. non-sustainable projects in their annual reports. In 
fact, DBSA and IDC do not even have a clear common definition of what constitutes infrastructure 
more generally, with IDC including some services while DBSA uses a more standard definition 
of physical infrastructure. This has implications for both external observers seeking to quantify 
the role of these NDBs in sustainable infrastructure provision, as well as the ability of NDBs 
themselves to benchmark their own activity and ramp up lending for sustainable projects. 
Second, both the IDC and DBSA have environmental and social sustainability frameworks that 
have been influenced by the policies of the World Bank and IFC as well as the Equator Principles, 
but the level of actual implementation is less clear. The environmental and social safeguard 
policies of the two NDBs are highly commendable, and have clearly strengthened in recent years 
(notably at DBSA with their involvement with the GEF). However, both banks have small staffs 
that are responsible for ensuring that project assessment and monitoring is done in compliance 
with these frameworks. This staff will participate in the decision-making process in their banks, 
but their authority is by all accounts secondary to project staff. Given the relatively broad range 
of priorities at the banks, it is unlikely that environmental and social considerations will be the 
deciding factor in the decision to fund any particular project. If these and other NDBs are serious 
about sustainability, they need to scale up the staff size of their sustainability units. At the moment, 
both IDC and DBSA have units that are too small to effectively manage the environmental and 
social assessments and monitoring of all the projects in which the institutions are involved. It may 
also be necessary for the profile of these units to be raised so that they have more seniority in the 
organizations.
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One financial instrument developed by IDC and DBSA—the community trusts used with the 
REIPPP renewable power programme—does appear quite innovative in addressing social issues, 
and may be worth scaling up and replicating at other NDBs. By financing communities’ ability to 
take an equity stake in new energy projects, this approach can reduce the risk of social conflict that 
sometimes hampers projects, and also provide communities with a revenue stream that can be used 
to tackle other social needs. 
Third, the sources of funding for NDBs is critical to their ability to provide financing at attractive 
terms to borrowers, and hence act as a major catalyst to sustainable infrastructure. DBSA and IDC 
raise most of their resources in capital markets, unlike most other NDBs in Africa that do not have 
access to liquid domestic capital markets. While this allows DBSA and IDC to raise funds on their 
own and not depend on the government budget or subsidies—an important advantage—it also 
makes their cost of funding relatively high. Private banks in South Africa can also offer funding 
at competitive prices, and require less bureaucratic hassles than in particular DBSA. In the case 
of the IDC, this is not a problem, since its primary function is to promote private sector industrial 
development and the infrastructure that supports it. However, in the case of the DBSA, this means 
that it is likely to fund the least creditworthy municipalities and the least bankable infrastructure 
projects, with obvious negative consequences for its own financial sustainability.
NDBs face difficulties in bringing down their cost of funding, assuming they do not have 
major transfers from the government budget or other earmarked sub-market financing sources 
(as, for example, is the case of BNDES in Brazil). One possibility—used with some success by 
DBSA—is to borrow at concessional rates from international public lenders like the World Bank, 
African Development Bank or major bilaterals, which brings its overall cost of funding down. 
Co-financing with these institutions is another option. The downside is that such resources are 
limited and cannot be relied upon for long-term strategic direction, such as promoting sustainable 
infrastructure. Another option going forward is to tap the growing market for green bonds, which 
could allow NDBs to access funds at better rates than they would otherwise, with the proviso that 
the funds are directed specifically toward green projects. This approach requires building an NDB 
that gives confidence to international investors, both in terms of project success as well as an 
NDB’s own financial results. 
Fourth, this study suggests that the value proposition that NDBs can offer is not always clear, 
and needs to be considered strategically if an NDB is expected to have a transformative impact. 
Given the funding issues noted above, the two South African NDBs will have difficulties funding 
major infrastructure at attractive financial terms, especially considering their bureaucracy vis a 
vis private sources. This could be offset with first-rate technical advice and project preparation to 
overcome the problem of developing “bankable projects”, but neither IDC nor DBSA are seen as 
providing this type of service. The new DBSA fund set up with the European Union to support 
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project preparation can help in this regard, but a more sustainable approach is to develop the kind 
of in-house practical expertise that project developers need to sustainable infrastructure projects 
going. This is less of an issue with IDC, as it has a more niche market supporting new private 
sector business, but it would also benefit from having a tighter operational focus than its current 
broad range of priorities.  
30
Annex 1. Basic Data on African National Development Banks
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